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SPEECH OF SENATOR HIKE MANSFIELD (D. , HONTAJ:'JA)

To Be Delivered at the
Bicentennial Horld Affairs Forum of the
Foreign Policy Association
To be Held at the
Hotel Penn Sheraton
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Nay

1, 1959

FOR RELEASE HAY 2, 1959 (A.M.'s)

..
Tha11k you for yo·:xr ldnd vmr{s of introduction.

They

unc~eserved.

are deeply appreciated though

Ladies and Gentlemen, your v1elcome has been v1arm and
generous ancl I shall do my best not to \-lear :t t thin.
~~nov7

As you

this is my seconc visit v7ith the Foreign Policy l'.ssociation

of Pittsburgh .

To have been

ure and a reassurance.
the Senate.

as!~ec1

to come again i s both a pleas-

It is a little

lil~e

being re-elected to

I am honored and I am most gratefu l to you , as I

am to the c::tizens of f."lontana, fo-r giving me a second chance.
Before proceeC: i ng to my remarks for this evening, I
\·7ant to

e~cpress

to you, to yo.1r hard\·7 or!dng and able director

(Mr. Higgins) ancl, in truth, to all the foreign policy associa-

tions throughout the country, my admiration for the very s ignificant publ::..c service v1hich you perform.
The-re v1as a t ime vlhen the nation faced the problem of
getting adequate and

~rompt

\·Jhere in the HorlC!.

That problem has largely been solved.

i nforruation on developments else-

tiodern means of commun::cati on b-ring the people of the United
States, just as soon as i t :;.s made, almost more nevJS than they
can handle.
A related problem, hm"lever, remai ns.

It i s ill'..ls-

trated by a Ne\-7 York T:;.mes ne.tiomJ::de survey of p·.1blic attitucles on the Berli n s i tuatim1.

The su-rvey, maC:::e several v1eeks

ago, shov1ed that \lhile an oven-Jhelming percentage of Americans
favored )istanc:ing firro 11 :;.n the Berlin situation a lmost l:-0% did

...
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did not lmow that in standi ng finn in

Berl~n

we ,;'lere standing

over a hundred miles inside Communist Germany.
This suggests to me that vlhile the problem of supplying the news from abroad in sufficient quantity is being met, the
problem of fillinz in the

bacl~ground

and of giving the nev.1s per-

spective in terms of the nation's needs and interests has not yet
been adequately met.

It is precisely in this field that the work

of the foreign policy association is most useful.

As a Member of

the Senate and the Commi ttee on Foreign Relations, I applaud you
for your contribution to public understanding of the vital international issues which confront the nation.

I e}t.press the hope

that you will go on doing even more in this connection.
I am

he~e,

tonight, to participate with you in a small

way in your important vmrk.

I am here to discuss one segment of

the international situati on--the question of Germany.
At this point in the unfolding of that question I believe it is reasonable to say that as a nation,
is such a thing as a problem in

Ge~~any.

that v1e must 1Jstand f i rmu i n Germany.

Further, that we realize

Hore recently, we have

heard too of the need for not only ''firmness :. but also
lity·· .

that there

\ie kno~-1

11

flexib:.-

Let me try, tonight, to go beyond those slogans, for, in

truth, that is what they are.

Let me try, toni ght, not merely

to reiterate the need of be i ng firm or flexible or f i rmly flexible or fle:1dbly fir..n.

Rather, let me try to

e~t.plore

,;vith you

the problem which confronts us i n Germany and the possibilities
of dealing vlith it in ways other than disastrous
diplomatic retreat.

~-1ar

or disastrous

'A

THE :PP.OBI..Ef1 IN GEP11ANY

The problem which confronts us in Germany is a segment
of the world-wide problem of establishing equitable, rational and
evolving, conditions of peace.

Today the crisis looms in a di-

vided Germany and a divided Berlin.

Tomorrow the scene of princi-

pal danger may shift to the Middle East.

The day after it could

be in the Far East that the clouds of conflict gather.
Since the end of the second war we have lived with a
succession of international crises in these and other regions
of the globe.
ous mine.

It is as though the world were a vast and danger-

We have rushed from one point of imminent or actual

cave-in to another in a never-ending struggle to shore up the
sagging roof of peace.

\rle have timbered with a Berlin airlift,

with a military defense of South Korea, with vast aid-programs
in Europe, Asia and else't'lhere,

~vith

troops in Lebanon and 1j7ith

naval pmr1er and other measures in the Formosan Straits.
These costly and strenuous improvisations represent
our efforts to prevent a complete collapse of peace.
doubtful,

hmr~ever,

that

~oJhat

It is

these measures have produced in

the principal zones of danger--in Germany and Central Europe,
in the l1iddle East and in Asia--this patchNorlc of timbering on
~.1hich

the fate of civilization rests--would meet a minimum

safety code.

The fact is that a dangerous world, no less than

a dangerous mine, is not made safer, in any permanent sense, by
patchwork.

Improvisations may be unavoidable, as interim meas-

ures, as desperate measures.

They ought not to be confused,

.,
- 2 -

however, with peace.

On

the contrary,

improv~_sations

may con-

ceal an encroaching danger to ourselves and to the rest of the
world by creating the illusion of stability, by permitting the
postponement of essential, fundamental changes until it becomes
perilously late to make them.
Something of that sort, I believe, lies at the root
of the present problem i n

GeL~any.

For years now, there has

existed in that nation a kind of surface stability.
This is the appearance of that stability.

In Hestern

Germany v1hich houses about SJ million Germans, the responsible,
representative government of the Federal Republic, its capital
in the city of Bonn,functions with a high degree of effectiveness.

West Germany has one of the most productive and dynamic

industrial economies in the world.

It also has the substantial

beginnings of a powerful German military establishment.

Beside

this establishment, there are garrisoned over 275,000 other NATO
troops--French, British and American--many with their dependents.
To the East of the Federal Republic is a communistheld German territory, much smaller in area and with a population of only 17 millions.

Many Germans regard this region not

as East Germany but as Central Germany, having in mind the Polishannexed territories beyond the Oder-Neisse as the true, the unredeemed East.

For our purposes tonight, however, I shall speak

of the region as East Germany or Communist Germany.

In this

sector of the divided nation, there is poverty, stagnation and
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oppression from v1hi.ch vast numbers have fled to the \t!est in
recent years.

Increasingly, however, we hear reports of plans,

if not the beginning, of an economic revival in the East.
communist rule in Eastern Germany.

There is

A

German totalitarian regime exists there by virtue of its own
and Soviet power and the acquiescence, however sullen, of the
East German people.

As in the Hest, a German military establish-

ment has been reconstituted in the East, under communist control.
It is supplemented by many divisions of Soviet Russian troops.
This brief sketch of a divided Germany also fits in
microcosm, with some variations, the present s i tuation in a
divided Berlin.

A principal difference is that

All~ed

and

Soviet Russian forces still retain tangible, visible responsibility for what happens, respectively, in the Western and Eastern sectors of the c ity.

Garrisons of both are present and the

Russians control the routes through East Germany over which
French, British and Ameri can forces must pass, from their bases
in Hest Germany to their outpost in Berlin.
Under the ultimate control of the Allie s, Hest Berlin
has its own municipal government '"i th vJillie Brandt as its able,
outspoken i'Iayor.

Under Sovi et control, a sector of East Berlin--

Pankow--serves as the seat of the Communist East German regi me.
P..mong Germans of the t'-10 zones of the divided nation
and the two parts of Berli n there is a considerable contact,
offici al and unofficial, i n trade and i n other matters.

There

is no formal recognition, however, of the one by the other.

In

fact, of all the principal countries involved in the German
situation only the Soviet Union recognizes both the West and
East German governments.
That, in brief, is the look of stability in Germany.
The arrangements \<lhich underpin \~his stability are those which
evolved at the end of '(,Jorld Har II.

They were designed origi-

nally for the temporary occupation of a defeated Germany.

But

t11hat began as an expedient took on a k:tnd of permanence with
the breakdown in relations between the Soviet Union and the
vJestern nations.
All around the rim of Germany changes have taken
place.

vJithin

l~Jest

Germany and East Germany, respectively,

changes have also taken place.

But between the divisions, the

arrangements for stability have not changed in essentials for
years.
All of the nati ons i nvolved have recognized at one
time or another that these arrangements are inadequate.

He

and other Western nations have said, in effect, that they must
be changed.
changed.
later

The Soviet Union has admitted that they should be

The German leaders--East and trJest--knm'IT that sooner or

they~

be changed.

All involved have paid at least lip

service to the bas i c requirements of change, that is, to the need
for reunificati on of Germany and of its capital of Berlin and to
the need for a final l i qu i dati on of lrJorld vJar II.

...
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However, no nation has really moved from the position
it assumed years ago on how these admittedly necessary changes
should be brought about.

The vJestern position has been based,

at least until recently, on the contention that there should be
free all-German elections as the prerequisite to reunification
and a peace settlement.

The Russians have been vague on this

matter but it is apparent that even if they use the same language
as we do, they do not mean the same things.

They clearly do not

accept a unification of Germany by free all-German elections, if
it means, as it vlOuld at this time, the obliteration of German
communist political influence in East Germany.

It may be that

they are not really prepared to accept unification under any
circumstances unless it means the domination of all of Germany
by communism.
In the meantime, all have managed to live with the
existing arrangements, wi th a divided Germany and Berlin, part
free and part communist, with a Germany no longer at war but
not yet fully at peace.

On

only two occasions have these arrange-

ments been seriously chall enged.
imposed

blocl~ade

They were hit by the Stalin-

of Berlin :;.n 19l:.3.

Then, i n 1953, the com-

munist political structure i n East Germany w·as shaken by worker
uprisings.

Both attempts, as you know, failed.

The ltJestern

nations committed enormous resources in the Berlin airli ft and
in the supply and reconstruction of

vJest

Berlin.

Finally,

Stalin v1as persuaded to abandon his attempt to force us from
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the city and to unify it under communist control.

The Ease

German revolt which we supported with very articulate enthusiasm
was suppressed by Soviet military power and the hope of a spontaneous unification of all Germany under freedom, in that fashion, was set back.
Since 1953, the status quo has not again been subjected to a major test anywhere in Germany.

To be sure, there

have been incidents which have sent tremors through the stability
but they did not upset it.

Just last November, for example, Mr.

Khrushchev warned that he would change the status quo at Berlin.
He did not schedule the execution of the change, however, until
this month.

Now, apparently, it has been postponed, pending the

results of the coming conferences.
In short, the German situation is still held together
by the same provisional, improvised arrangements which have held
it together for years.

These arrangements are tied to certain

basic conditions, conditions which must prevail if the stability
in Germany, in its present form, is to continue.

We must see

clearly what these conditions are if we al:'e to measure the scope
of the problem which confronts us.

Let me, therefore, outline

them at this point.
First, the present stability in Germany depends upon
the absence of decisive accidents or provocations between the
military forces of the lrlest and the Soviet Union.

It is conceiv-

able that there may be hostile or threatening contact

bet~-1een

- 7 these forces, as indeed there has been, without a collapse.
This contact, however, cannot go too far.

At some undetermined

point, military accidents or provocations are likely to set off
a chain reaction which will engage in a decisive fashion the
prestige--the face, so to speak--of the principal powers.

At

that point the irrevocable slide or plunge into the abyss of
war will have begun.
That, then, is one condition of the continuance of
the status quo in Germany, of the present stability which is
neither peace nor war.

There must be an absence of hostile

accidents or provocations between the military forces in Germany
which go beyond the point of no return.
The second condition is German acquiescence, the
acquiescence of the people of the East as well as the West in
the systems under which they now live.

Let me say, parentheti-

cally at this point that I do not suggest that this is desirable.
I merely say that it is one of the factors which underl;e the
existing stability.
As

a part of acquiescence, Germans must be willing

to accept the continued division of their country, the continued
presence of foreign troops in great numbers in their land and
the mi litary arrangements which join one segment of the nation
to NATO for protection and subordinate the other to the Warsaw
Pact.

The third basic condition of the status quo is that
the Hestern powers and the Soviet Union must also tolerate the
existing

div~sion

of Germany and the present arrangements for

occupation of a divided Berlin8

In short, if the German people

must accept the status quo, the Hestern Powers and the Soviet
Union must not challenge it, at least they must not challenge
it with anythin$ much stronger than words.

Further, the peoples

of the Hest must be prepared, as must the people of the communist
bloc to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establishments
and the instruments of cold war which are made necessary in part
by the existing arrangements for keeping the status quo in Germany.
In stating these conditions, I emphasize again that I
do not advocate them or subscribe to their desirability.

I

merely note them as underlying the present situation in Germany,
as the conditions precedent to its continuance.

These conditions

are not the foundations of an equitable, rational and evolving
peace in Germany and Central Europe.
timbering of an improvised truce.

They are the patchwork

Nevertheless, they are the

conditions on which the lives of the German people, the people
of Europe and, in a larger sense, the survival of a recognizable
human civilization

not>~

depend.

If one of these conditions is changed in any significant fashion, I cannot see that the present situation in Germany
is likely to persist.

It seems to me that it must either evolve

into something more durable or it will collapse in the chaos of
of war, limited or unlimited.
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Putting aside for a moment

r1:r .

Khrushchev 1 s announce -

ment that he proposes to alter one of the conditions of the present stability, that is, the arrangement at Berli n, what of
others?

Can these others, in any event, be counted upon to sup-

port indefinitely the
can be.

e~d.sting

situation?

I do not see how they

I believe that these other condi t i ons have already

changed markedly beneath the surface calm, that they are continuing to change and that they cannot change much more before the
churning shall break through the surface.
In that sense, I am pe rs uaded that the present stability i n Germany vlas i n the process of eros i on long before Nr.
ro~rushchev's

announcement last November.

Indeed , I said so in

the Senate many months prior to that time,
Let us look for a moment at the present state of these
conditi on£ of stabil1.ty, these bas i c conditions Hhich must prevail if there i s to be no change i n the German situation.
the f i rst--that there munt be no

m~litary acc~dent

or provocation

in Germany 'iil hich goes beyond the point of no return.
obvi ous that none, so far, has done so.
grave near-mi sses.

Take

It i s

Bu t there have been

The Berli n Blocltade was a massive near-miss.

Since that t i me there have been other i nc idents, provocations.
I neeG not catalogue them.

You have seen reference to them time

and agai n--to the buzzed trans ports, to the challenged convoys,
to the downed planes and the detained sold i ers.

I do not know

which of these i ncidents may have been prompted by h i gher Soviet
headquarters and which may have come about by the whim of some
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local commander.

Given a conducive set of

c ircums~~nces2-_how

ever, it is far from i nconce i vable that any i ncident of this
k i nd mi ght go out of control.
A£art ftom deliberate provocation, there still remains
the very real danger of military accident, if not on our part,
then on theirs.

The chances of accident multiply when forces

are poised--as they are in Germany--at swords-point and are
keyed tight by the electrified atmosphere of cold
ganda war.

"t~Jar,

of propa-

They multiply agai n as the countdowns of the new

weapons quicken and the i r delivery times shorten.

They multiply

stl ll again as these devices of incredibLe devastation find their
way i nto more and more hands.

In this sense, then, a basic pre-

condition of the status guo i n Germany has indeed changed, quite
apart from any recent change in Soviet QOlicy with respect to
Berlin.

It has changed in the sense that the margin for mili-

tary error or provocati on has narrowed.

The prospects are,

moreover, that the margi n will narrow sti ll further as time goes
on.
I believe, too, that it i s reasonable to suggest that
the acqui escence of the Germans--East and West--the second basic
conditi on on whi ch the status quo rests, has also changed s i gni ficantly and will conti nue to change.

It is, of course, diffi-

cult to document the sentiment of a whole people.
formed, however, that there i s great
East Germany.

une}~pressed

We are indiscontent in

We know, moreover, that there are movements for

reunifi cation and neutralization in Western Germany, even if we
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cannot measure their strength.

vJe must assume that currents of a

similar and probably stronger kind flow through East Germany even
though Mr . Gallup has yet to conduct a poll in that region.
It is obvious that the defeated Germany, the disarmed
Germany, the shattered, starving Germany for which the present
improvised arrangements of stabi lity were devised, no longer
exists.

As I noted earlier in my remarks, at least in one zone--

in the vJest--there is a revitalized nation.

Furthermore, in both

zones, there now exist German military forces and political structures manned by Germans, even if, in the East, they may not be
controlled ulti mately by Germans.

In both zones, finally, a new

generation is coming into its own--a generation which was young
in the days of defeat but which, now and in the years immediately
ahead, will i nevitably rise to leadership in Germany.

In these

circumstances, i t would be unrealistic in the extreme to believe
that the arrangements for stability which exist i n Germany--devised in another hour and for another setting and modified only
within each zone separately--will continue to serve for the indefinite future.

In short, we must face the likelihood that the

second condition of the status quo--the continued acquiescence
of the German people i n di vision and quasi-occupation may well
be dra\lling to an end.

He must reckon with the strong possibility

that, increasingly, Germans will seek thei r unity and national
equality by whatever means may be avai lable if constructive machinery to facilitate i t i n peace and order does not exist.

- lL. As for the third basic condition on 't·7hi ch the E._resent
stability in Germany rests, I have alrea£y noted that if we are
to go on as we are, the Western nations and the Soviet Union
must not challenge the existing arrangements with anythi ng much
stronger than 't•m rds.

oc~asional

In fact, except fort dangerous but limited

mi litary incidents and provocati ons, neither has challenged it,
in any other fashion in recent years.

Further I sai d that both

the people of the Western nations and the Soviet Union must be
willing to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establishments and the instruments of cold war to keep a rough equilibrium
of force not only in Germany but throughout the world.

That,

too, has been done until now, although I would be less than
honest i f I did not express my deep concern over continuing reports that the Soviet effort in this respect is greater than our
~·

I am not in a pos i tion to evaluate those reports.

The of-

ficial secrecy--necessary and unnecessary--which engulfs this
question cannot be easily penetrated by Members of Congress.
The di squi eting reports, however, come from hi ghly qualified
and

co~petent

sources and they do not auger well for the future.

They certainly raise doubts about the likeli hood of mai ntaining
the present stability in Germany or anywhere else for that matter.
Finally, the third condi tion of the status quo also
depends upon the mai ntenance of the present arrangements at
Berli n.

~Je

now knot-1' that these arrangements have been challenged.

Mr. Khrushchev has assai led the vJestern pos i tion in Berlin and

- 13 demanded that it change.

He has done so, however, only in words

and, in that respect, his challenge is not new.
What is new, what does threaten the status guo is the
strange action by which Mr. l<hrushchev proposes to bring about
this change.

He proposes to withdraw himself from Berlin, that

is, he says that he will remove Soviet forces from the city and
from the routes of access to it.
egually strange.

Our official answer has been

We have said, in effect, that the Russians

cannot leave the city and the routes of access, that they certainly cannot leave it in spirit and perhaQs not even in body.
After trying for many years to get the Russians out of the areas
into which they sprawled after World War II, here is one place
that we do not wish them to leave.
The reason for this is clear.

If the Russians do quit

Berlin, they will turn over the instruments of control to East
German communists.

That opens, for the Soviet Union, a large

field of manoeuvre in the war of nerves.

But in a more funda-

mental sense, the action will also work a change in the underlying conditions of the status quo in Germany.

It will increase

the strains and stresses on the essential military restraints
which are a part of the present stability.

It will do the same

to German acquiescence which is also a part of i t.

In short,

the entire German situation will move into a period of grave
instability out of which is likely to emerge either a new status
quo or conflict.
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There has been a great deal of

speculat ~on

Mr. Khrushchev has threatened to ta!ce this step.

on why

Cne may as-

sume, of course, that Mr. Xhrushchev has been motivated by what
he believes

~-1ill

be ultimately to the advantage of the Soviet

Union and world communism.
motivated by what

~ie

I would hope that we are equally

believe to be to the advantage of the

United States and to world freedom.
l!Jhat is significant at this moment, is not so much
the ulti mate aims of Soviet communism.

We

kno~

what they are

and it is of little value to intone them again and again as
though this litany will somehow protect us from them.

More

s i gni ficant is the question of how Mr. Khrushchev proposes to
serve communist interests through Soviet policies at a moment
in history when the transcendent interests of civilization, and
of the human species i tself 2 rest in delicate balance between
survival ancl nuclear obliteration.
No one who is not pri vy to the operations of Mr.
Khrushchev's mind and the inner 'tvorldng of the machinery of
Soviet communism can be certain of what l i es beneath the Soviet
manoeuvre at Berli n.
combinat~on

The move could have been motivated by a

of any of a score of reasons, some logical, some

i llogical, some groping tat·mrds peace, some stumbli ng towards
war.
The i nterpretation of the charades of Sovi et policy
may be a fascinat i ng game.

As I have already noted, however,

this game i s essenti ally speculative.

vJhat seems to me most
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important at this point i:.s not to guess at ti.1e o1Jccu.rs conte:..1ts
of the Soviet mind but rather to get clearly

~n

our ovm minds

..;-1hat it is that vle--the Hestern nations--seek in this situation.
~'7hat

\'Jhat is most important is to make certain that
reasonably related to the situation that
clay, not to one t-1hich vle would
have

ex~sted

lil~e

e~cists

't'le seek is

in Germany to-

to exist or one which may

years ago and no longer exists.

If the interests of this nation, of freedom and of
human civilization lay only ::n maintaining e:Ki.sting arrangements
in Germany, if f.'Ir. Khrushchev's manoeuvre at Berlin were the only
threat to these arrangements then, indeed, it vmuld be sufficient
to counter that manoeuv-.ce merely by

21

Is that, however, the case?

standing

firm.~.

I think it is clear that

t1r. Khrushchev's manoeuvre at Berlin is not the only danger to
the status quo in Germany.

Further, I question 't-lhether an ef-

fort to maintain that status quo indefinitely is,

~n

fact, in

accord wita the interests of this nation, freedom and human
c:l..vilization.
To be sure, v1e shall "stand firm" at Berl.:n and in
Germany.

I know of no responsible person in the government of

this nation who holds otherwise.
wise.

I certainly do not hold other-

l1oreover, I know of no statesman in the t-Jestern world

who holds otherwise.

We shall stand firm because to permit

the forces of freedom to be frightened, cajoled or driven from
Berlin--the future capital of all Germany--will be to remove
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one of the props of the present stability in that couutry before
another firmer support is in place.

Let us not,

ho~'lever,

con-

fuse the necessity for standing firm in that sense with a mere
maintenance of present arrangements in Germany for the indefinite future.
I am not persuaded that the interests of this nation,
of freedom and of human civilization lie in an indefinite continuance of the Eresent military situation in Berlin and in
Germany, a situation which, increasingly, will pern1it an accident
or an irresponsible local provocation to precipitate the suicide
of civilization.

I am not persuaded that these interests are

served by perpetuating arrangements in Germany \'lhich offer little prospect of Erogress towards peaceful unification to the
German people.

I am not Eersuaded that these interests are

served by the ever-mounting costs of the arms rivalry of the
cold 't'lar, and the propaganda war--costs

~1hich

are occasioned in

great part by the existing situation in Germany.
:·mat I am trying to suggest 1 in short.1. is that it i ·s
not enough, in our own interests, merely to stand fast in Germany, as an end in itself.

It is not enough merely to seek to

sustain an existing situation which is ceasing to be adequate
for minimum stability in Germany and Central Europe.

Rather,

we must stand fast in order to go forward, in order to establish
more equitable, rational and evolving conditions of peace.
That is the challenge of the impending conferences on
Germany.

We must strive in them, it seems to me, to create a

...
- 17 less volatile situat:ion in Berlin, not merely by chan_g_:tE£ the
Western position in that city as the Russians have suggested
but perhaps by altering the status of the entire city, by international1zing all Berlin under United Nations or other sat;sfactory international auspices as an interim arrangement.

We must

seek a readjustment of the military situation in all of Germany
and Central Europe in a fashion which promises to reduce the
danger of war by accident or provocation. vle must seel~, finally,
full
a beginning on the spread o~olitical freedom throughout Germ~ny

and on German unification and, to that end, we must enlist

in far greater measure than heretofore, the participation of the
Germans themselves--East and tJest.
I realize, fully, that .,;;e shall not get anyv1here with
negot:ations to these ends
in

the~.r

~f

the Russians are not of a mind,

m.m interest, to move in a similar direction.

have said, I do not presume to
mind at this time, nor do I

~now

l~nm.oJ

As I

the contents of the Soviet

of anyone who does.

I do !mmv

that regardless of n.ussian intent:'. ons \ve shall not begin to move
towarcs these ends unless v1e ourselves are clear as to \·7 here it
is we \'lant to go.

\:Je require at tl:.is point i.n t:.'..me, beyond all

else, a frank recognit i on of the importance of e change in Germany, a chanse not in the manner expounded by the Russians and
not necessar:ly in the manner first pro j ected by ourselves years
ago.

Rather 1 we need a change which conforms to the realities

of the present, a chan3e brought about by concessions which match
concessions.

To this task, we--all the Hestern nations--must

bring a new dedication, a new determination to develop equitable,
durable and evolving conditions of peace.

